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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The nuclear accident at Fukushima Dai Ichi is 
considered to be one of the most important in histo-
ry, together with those at Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl. However, institutional investigations of 
the accident do not capture the complexity of the sit-
uation that the plant’s operators faced. To remedy 
this, the concept of engineering thinking in emergen-
cy situations had been developed (Guarnieri and 
Travadel, 2014); the concept will be defined later.  
Following the accident, the plant’s director Masao 
Yoshida testified to the Japanese government’s In-
vestigation Committee. The transcript of the hearing 
was released to the public. The hearings of 22 and 29 
July 2011, has been available in French since March 
2015 (Guarnieri et al., 2015). The following hearings 
will form volumes 2 and 3. The fourth volume will 
be devoted to the analysis of the corpus.  
The director’s testimony not only allows us to fill 
in the gaps in institutional reports, but also to gain a 
better understanding of the factors influencing deci-
sion-making and action in extreme situations.  
This article demonstrates the value of Yoshida’s 
testimony in thinking about engineering thinking in 
emergency situations. The first section analyses how 
the Fukushima Dai Ichi accident was presented in 
the principal investigation reports. The second sec-
tion highlights the similarities between Yoshida’s 
testimony and the narrative form of the story. Final-
ly, the third section is a detailed examination of his 
testimony, and shows the usefulness of the contribu-
tion to the development of engineering in extreme 
situations.  
2 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS 
 
This first section outlines the four institutional re-
ports selected for this study, and the organizations 
that prepared them. The content of these reports is 
briefly summarized and analysed in terms of their 
representation of the accident.  
2.1 Institutional reports 
After the Fukushima accident, many institutions 
analysed the causes of the accident in order to draw 
out the main lessons and improve the safety of nu-
clear installations. Here we examine the reports of: 
the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, appointed by the 
Japanese government (ICANPS, 2012); the Inde-
pendent Investigation Commission of the Japanese 
Diet (NAIIC, 2012); the Nuclear Energy Agency 
(NEA, 2013); and the United States National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS, 2014). These documents 
come from four agencies: two are Japanese, one is 
international and one is American, and they have dif-
ferent goals, draw different conclusions and propose 
different recommendations.  
The Investigation Committee on the Accident at 
the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (ICANPS) 
was created following a decision of the Japanese 
government on 24 May, 2011. Yotaro Hatamura, 
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Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo, 
chaired the ten-member committee. The other mem-
bers were researchers and judges, assisted by eight 
technical and policy experts. The purpose of the 
Committee was to make recommendations to pre-
vent the spread of the damage caused by the accident 
and the recurrence of similar accidents. Therefore, 
the investigation sought to identify the causes of the 
accident and the damage that it created. Its members 
were given the responsibility of conducting a thor-
ough investigation that would produce satisfactory 
answers to all questions related to the accident, 
which would be valid for at least a century. The 
Committee undertook tours of the nuclear power 
plants at Fukushima Dai Ichi and Dai Ni, held hear-
ings with the directors of local government authori-
ties and others involved in the management of the 
accident. An interim report was published on 26 De-
cember 2011. The final report was presented to the 
Prime Minister on 23 July, 2012. The Committee 
was dissolved by order of the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice on 28 September, 2012.  
The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Commission (NAIIC) was set up by the Japanese 
Diet, under Article 10 of the law enacted on 30 Oc-
tober, 2011. On 8 December, 2011, the ten members 
of the Commission were appointed by the President 
of the Diet. It was headed by Kiyoshi Kurokawa, a 
doctor and former president of the Scientific Council 
of Japan. The Commission’s nine other members 
consisted of scientists, lawyers and political actors. 
The NAIIC investigation analysed the causes of the 
accident and the damage it produced. It also looked 
at the reaction of stakeholders and the effectiveness 
of their management of the emergency. Finally, it 
proposed measures that could be applied in order to 
prevent another nuclear accident in Japan or limit its 
consequences. Both chambers of the Japanese Par-
liament insisted on the need to conduct this expert 
investigation, from both a theoretical and scientific 
viewpoint. It was tasked with producing recommen-
dations to strengthen the legislative framework in 
Japan and benefit the nation in the future. Moreover, 
their recommendations were required to be formu-
lated so that the whole world might benefit, and 
would therefore help to prevent another nuclear ac-
cident. Members of the Committee visited the five 
plants affected by the tsunami and interviewed more 
than a thousand people. Public meetings were held 
with residents who had been evacuated and workers 
at the plant. The results of the investigation were 
made public in a report published in September 
2012.  
One of the missions of the Nuclear Energy Agen-
cy (NEA) is to strengthen the legislative, scientific 
and technological foundations of nuclear safety with-
in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The report prepared by the 
Committee on Regulatory Nuclear Activities 
(CRNA), the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear 
Installations (CSNI) and the Committee on Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) was 
published in September 2013. Written under the 
leadership of Director General Luis Echávarri, this 
document enumerates the efforts of OECD member 
states to improve the management of safety in the 
wake of the accident, and offers some recommenda-
tions based on the key lessons learned. The report 
expresses the desire of the NEA to regularly to re-
vise nuclear safety standards and to circulate the les-
sons learned to its members.  
The United States National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS) finally published a report commissioned by 
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 
July 2014. The study was conducted by a committee 
of scientists and engineers with various skills. The 
committee, composed of twenty-one experts, was 
placed under the direction of Dr Norman P. Neu-
reiter. Thirty-nine meetings were held in order to 
collect and exchange information. Visits to Japanese 
plants – including Fukushima Dai Ichi – and Ameri-
can plants with the same design took place. The pur-
pose of the report was to summarize the various 
causes of the nuclear accident at Fukushima Dai 
Ichi, with a particular focus on the response of the 
operator. It also proposed recommendations to im-
prove the safety of United States’ nuclear facilities, 
from an operational and regulatory point of view.  
2.2 The representation of the accident in official 
reports 
An examination of the recommendations put for-
ward in these reports shows the vulnerabilities that 
were identified by investigators and helps us to un-
derstand their representation of the accident. In this 
article, the concept of the representation refers to the 
mental map of subjects, related to the causal, proxi-
mal and influential relations “that an individual (or 
by extension a group of individuals) sees as a prob-
lem or a problematic issue” (Chaxel et al., 2014).  
According to these four reports, the accident at 
Fukushima Dai Ichi highlights a lack of preparation 
on the part of the operator (TEPCO), and Japanese 
institutions in dealing with such an event. They state 
that TEPCO staff lacked adequate training and ap-
propriate skills to respond to emergencies, and go on 
to say that communication between workers and de-
cision-makers, as well as poor coordination between 
the various emergency response centres made it dif-
ficult to react effectively to the accident.  
They also suggest that the accident was due to a 
failure to take into account global, state-of-the-art 
advances and new safety approaches, notably the de-
fence-in-depth concept. They claim that TEPCO and 
Japanese institutions had not taken the steps neces-
sary to bring the safety of their facilities up to inter-
national standards. Consequently, they emphasize 
the need to strengthen defence-in-depth measures 
and examine the possibility of beyond design-basis 
accidents or simultaneous accidents at multiple sites.  
Another recommendation concerns the independ-
ence of the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency (NISA). Although this agency knew about 
TEPCO’s safety weaknesses, it did not seek to recti-
fy the situation. The skills, commitment and trans-
parency of NISA were thus called into question, and 
the reform of the monitoring and regulatory system 
for Japanese nuclear facilities was identified as an-
other key point to be addressed.  
These accident analyses offer no innovative in-
sights in nuclear safety. They focus on the need to 
strengthen the application of known concepts and to 
set higher safety margins to prevent further acci-
dents. They advocate new standards and encourage 
the inclusion of overwhelming, multiple accidents. 
For the bodies concerned, the transparency and inde-
pendence of the nuclear regulator, and the promotion 
of safety culture by the operator, are fundamental to 
ensuring safety at installations. The management of a 
major accident is therefore only represented in terms 
of the existing organisation and resources.  
However, in such an accident, operators are faced 
with a scenario that goes far beyond anything previ-
ously considered. The lack of electricity and the 
worsening of the situation at Fukushima highlight 
the need to adapt to new and unforeseen conditions. 
Furthermore, the earthquake and tsunami damaged 
the country’s infrastructure, hampering the delivery 
of both human and material resources to the plant.  
To better understand what has to be done in such 
conditions, the concept of engineering thinking in 
emergency situations has been defined as “engineer-
ing activities that are significantly impeded due to a 
lack of resources in the face of a societal emergen-
cy” (Guarnieri and Travadel, 2014). Engineering 
thinking in emergency situations denotes engineer-
ing activities that are hampered by emergency condi-
tions. Engineering takes places in a state of pro-
nounced uncertainty, where this is a lack of human 
and material resources and high societal expecta-
tions.  
Engineers must therefore adapt to the context and 
seek innovative solutions in order to overcome the 
lack of appropriate and available resources. Here, the 
organization corresponds to “a structure that results 
from a decision and takes the minimal form of a hi-
erarchy, rules, a group (‘members’), and superviso-
ry and sanction instruments that are applicable to a 
specific activity with a particular goal” (Guarnieri et 
Travadel, 2014).  
In contrast to the official reports, Yoshida’s testi-
mony provides another perspective on the accident. 
It clarifies points that were not fully addressed and 
demonstrates engineering thinking in emergency sit-
uations in action at Fukushima Dai Ichi in the after-
math of the earthquake and tsunami. In his account, 
the director explains his decisions and the actions 
that were carried out in an attempt to maintain the 
integrity of the reactors and limit damage to the fa-
cilities. He also reminds us of the difficult conditions 
in which these actions had to be undertaken. 
3 MASAO YOSHIDA’S TESTIMONY 
This section looks at the hearings where Masao 
Yoshida gave his testimony and highlights the simi-
larities with the narrative story form. His account is 
then compared with the content of institutional re-
ports, by highlighting parallels between this infor-
mation and the concept of engineering thinking in 
emergency situations.  
3.1 Yoshida’s testimony: a story of an accident 
The hearings that Masao Yoshida took part in 
were conducted by the ICANPS. The Committee in-
terviewed several political and technical actors who 
participated in the management of the accident and 
its consequences. The director was convened to ap-
pear five times between 22 July and 6 November, 
2011. These interviews lasted twenty-eight hours in 
total and primarily addressed the actions that were 
carried out in response to the accident. The transcript 
of the hearing was made public by the Japanese gov-
ernment on 11 September 2014 in the form of eleven 
documents.  
Their content can be seen as a narrative of the nu-
clear accident. A narrative is an oral, written, drawn 
or ritualized representation of real or fictional 
events, arranged in chronological order and forming 
a coherent whole (Adam, 1996). A life history is de-
fined as “a generic expression where one person 
tells their life or a part of their life to one or more 
interlocutors. This narrative may lead to a book, a 
recording or a film” (Legrand, cited in Burrick 
2010). 
In this case, the transcripts of the first two hear-
ings correspond to a life history as they describe the 
fragment of Yoshida’s life that unfolded at the Fuku-
shima plant. His professional relations provide a bet-
ter understanding of the organization that was in 
place at the time of the nuclear accident.  
However, the two transcripts omit certain dimen-
sions – notably, family and economic – found in the 
life stories usually studied by sociologists. The direc-
tor did not have complete freedom to narrate his ex-
perience, as the format of the hearings followed a set 
of questions prepared by the investigators. Notwith-
standing such ‘limitations’, there is still value for re-
searchers in the question and answer format. 
In practice, this testimony is the product of a 
‘semi-structured’ interview, i.e. “a form of interac-
tion similar to that of the conversation, through the 
ongoing adaptation of the researcher’s questions 
and interventions as the exchange develops” (Nos-
sik, 2011). In this story form, the interviewee (here 
Yoshida), orient their responses according to their 
understanding of the expectations of the question-
er(s) (Brun, 2003). The interview is therefore an in-
tersubjective construction created by its participants, 
who are in constant dialogue with the cultural, social 
and political context in which it takes place (Van 
Boeschoten, 2012). This form of interview also facil-
itates digression and provides opportunities for the 
narrator to relate anecdotes (Bernard, 2014).  
The story form allows the researcher to identify 
the thoughts and feelings of the narrator, who recon-
structs the story as they remember it. Here, it makes 
it possible to examine Yoshida’s relationship with 
the story, the protagonists, and his interlocutors, i.e. 
the ICANPS investigators. 
Deviations from the main thread of the story serve 
to make sense of the story, through recourse to ex-
planations or comparisons. Additional details or in-
formation are provided to justify how the story un-
folds and explain how events relate to each other: 
they serve to guarantee coherence and intelligibility. 
Yoshida therefore selects the events that he believes 
are significant and establishes “the connections that 
are necessary to make it coherent” (Bourdieu, 1986).  
Yoshida’s testimony is based on his personal 
memories. Facts are therefore reconstructed accord-
ing to a – necessarily subjective – point of view. 
Although the main lines of the story are dictated by 
the investigator’s questions, its overall meaning 
comes to life through the eyes of the person who is 
providing the testimony. This person uses their own 
representational system to establish consistency be-
tween the statements they make; therefore the story 
told at the hearing was necessarily “artificial, varia-
ble and partial” (Van Boeschoten, 2012).  
These subjective biases only add value to personal 
testimony. Not only do these accounts contribute 
hitherto unpublished information to the recorded his-
tory of the event, they also make it possible to meas-
ure the orientation and the weight assigned to the 
event by the person giving the testimony (Ibid.).  
The director chooses some striking metaphors: the 
damaged reactor is compared to “a living being that 
struggled in every way possible” (Guarnieri et al., 
2015); or, realizing that forty of his staff might have 
died in the field, “I had decided to commit hara-kiri” 
(Ibid.). These statements demonstrate particularly 
clearly the huge difficulty and complexities that had 
to be taken into account in any decisions made in 
such an uncertain situation. His divergences from the 
main thread are particularly interesting, as they help 
in understanding the ‘gaps’ in official reports, where 
anything related to the emotions of the plant’s direc-
tor or its workforce was likely to be considered irrel-
evant. However, this information has a determining 
role in decision making, especially in extreme situa-
tions (Travadel and Guarnieri, 2015).  
3.2 Yoshida’s account 
The study of Yoshida’s narrative reveals connec-
tions between the management of the accident and 
the concept of engineering thinking in emergency 
situations. Some of the information it contains is 
new, and can be classified into three categories: fac-
tual, representational and technical.  
Institutional reports tell the story of Fukushima 
Dai Ichi a posteriori. For the sake of completeness, 
they provide an exhaustive description of all phe-
nomena, notably technical. This approach encour-
ages the authors to relate as facts certain elements 
that can only have been deduced through simulation, 
notably the chronology of events established by 
TEPCO. Certain phenomena were presumed to have 
happened only after the event, for example that a 
high concentration of hydrogen was the reason for 
the explosion of the reactor buildings. Furthermore, 
the director does not know or does not remember 
certain facts and details that the investigators tell 
him. This point is important, in particular to under-
stand the uncertainty that reigned at the Fukushima 
site after the tsunami hit. It means that decisions 
must have been taken in the absence of knowledge 
about certain reactor parameters. Furthermore, the 
emergency response centre had to coordinate multi-
ple tasks simultaneously, which cannot be effective-
ly represented by a classic schema where events fol-
low each other in chronological succession. The 
decisions and the actions that were taken, with a no-
table lack of resources, depended on one another. 
Many important factors came into play, including 
slow progress in completing tasks, the impact of 
events on the viability of the site, lessons learned 
from interventions at other plants, and the mobiliza-
tion of resources for other activities. 
From a representational point of view, some re-
ports (e.g. the NAS document), describe one after 
another the plant’s reactors and the evolution of their 
states. However, Yoshida’s testimony shows that the 
emergency response centre had to manage the entire 
site, and try to mitigate the degradation of various 
facilities at the same time. In addition, his account 
highlights the extreme complexity of managing the 
nuclear crisis.  
Immediately following the earthquake, the work-
force assembled in an anti-seismic building and 
formed an unofficial emergency response centre. 
They foresaw, based on the tsunami warning, a po-
tential problem in the reactor cooling system. How-
ever, it was the loss of electricity following the tsu-
nami that threw the unit into disarray, “We were all 
so floored that we were speechless. All we could do 
was remain calm and get on with administrative 
tasks, this is what we should do if there is a loss of 
all AC power, the famous Article 10. But, as I told 
you earlier, while we carried out these administra-
tive tasks, emotionally, we were annihilated.” The 
team found themselves, from that point on, “faced 
with a catastrophe” (Guarnieri et al., 2015).  
In an accident situation, frustration, nervousness 
and fear translate into emotional tension that in turn, 
plays a role in decision making and the actions that 
are taken. The third dimension, which complements 
the others, relates to actions taken in the field. The 
director repeatedly emphasizes the difficulty that 
workers had in carrying out their tasks. This inability 
to take effective action, coupled with the incompre-
hension and impatience of TEPCO executives who 
were not actually at the site, contributed to the ex-
treme situation experienced by workers (Guarnieri et 
al., 2015).  
Attempts to vent reactor 2, which are only men-
tioned in a few reports, perfectly illustrate the gap 
between what was happening in the field and at 
headquarters. TEPCO headquarters repeatedly issued 
orders to proceed with venting; although teams 
worked through the night, no workable solution 
could be found due to lack of suitable resources. Yo-
shida states his annoyance with this lack of under-
standing, which was perceived by the emergency re-
sponse centre as a failure to acknowledge the work 
they were doing, and their ongoing efforts. This only 
served to increase the frustration of teams who could 
not make the unit respond to their actions. These 
strong emotions and the role they play in decision 
making must be taken into account, if we are to have 
a better understanding of how the accident was man-
aged.  
The analysis of Yoshida’s testimony therefore 
helps to incorporate certain factors that are inherent 
in the concept of extreme situations. In this context, 
it is particularly important to note: the uncertain sit-
uation at the site; the lack of available resources; hi-
erarchical and social pressure; and the feeling of 
helplessness in the face of the progressive degrada-
tion of the facilities.  
Missing facts and the reconstruction of events 
presented in reports means that there is no accurate 
representation of the complexity and the challenges 
experienced by the workforce and the emergency re-
sponse centre. At the same time, it must be noted 
that the director’s testimony of how events unfolded 
are a subjective account of what happened. The tran-
script of his testimony does not necessarily corre-
spond to an objective description of the succession 
of events as they unfolded at the Fukushima site 
once the tsunami had hit. 
4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ENGINEERING THINKING IN EMERGENCY 
SITUATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
THE ACCIDENT 
This section demonstrates the usefulness of Yo-
shida’s account of events, based on the analysis of an 
extract of his testimony. It first briefly contextualises 
the events that are related in the narrative framework 
of the management of the crisis, and then highlights 
the similarities between the director’s account of 
events and certain markers of engineering thinking 
in emergency situations.  
4.1 Contextualisation of the extract 
The selected extract (Guarnieri et al., 2015: 207–
224) highlights the three categories of information 
(factual, technical and representational) described in 
the previous section.  
The excerpt is from the morning of the second day 
of the hearing, 29 July 2011. It follows a series of 
questions about the state of the emergency cooling 
systems of reactors 2 and 3, in particular, the deci-
sion to inject water into the reactors.  
The excerpt begins with a question from the inves-
tigators about the management of the accident fol-
lowing the explosion of reactor 1. Several questions 
relate to planned interventions on reactors 2 and 3, 
as the investigators try to understand the decisions 
that were taken given the record of the reactors’ pa-
rameters and the chronology of events. Yoshida is 
faced with a long series of questions about the 
course of the accident (based on the chronology pro-
vided by TEPCO), and he either answers succinctly, 
or asks for clarification. Some of his responses are 
longer, especially when he explains the sequence of 
events and why decisions were taken. He partially 
corrects some of the facts stated by the investigators 
with explanations, from an operational or technical 
point of view, that justify the actions that were car-
ried out.  
He also expresses his personal convictions at the 
time of the accident, and his feelings about what was 
happening. He refers to the atmosphere in the emer-
gency response centre (“we were very annoyed”), 
and the interventions from TEPCO headquarters. 
The excerpt ends with a break, when the investiga-
tors suspend the hearing.  
The investigators were interested in the period 
from 12–13 March. On 11 March, the earthquake 
and the tsunami had hit the east coast of Japan. 
While the subsequent loss of electricity prevented 
the normal functioning of many of the safety devices 
at the reactor, auxiliary cooling systems kicked in. In 
accordance with Japanese law on nuclear emergen-
cies, the director set up an on-site emergency re-
sponse centre. The unit is required to notify TEPCO 
of any changes in the status of the facilities; TEPCO 
in turn, informs the Japanese government. Shift 
teams remained in place and continued to carry out 
interventions on the nuclear units. They reported 
back any information they considered necessary to 
the emergency response centre, which coordinated 
the various teams.  
On the morning of 12 March, the building of reac-
tor 1 exploded. At the same time, the emergency re-
sponse centre discovered that reactor 3’s emergency 
core cooling systems no longer worked. This meant 
that they had to find a way to inject water in order to 
lower the temperature and pressure in the vessel. 
This manoeuvre was intended to prevent fuel rod 
damage, given their inability to activate the tank’s 
pressure relief valves.  
This work was hampered by both the degraded 
conditions created by the explosion of reactor 1 and 
their inability to obtain reliable measurements of the 
state of reactor 3. The high pressure in reactor 3 pre-
vented the injection of water into fire prevention cir-
cuits; consequently the water level began to fall, 
while the pressure increased. As preparations were 
put in place for the injection of water through a 
makeshift circuit, venting of the containment vessel 
gradually became inevitable. Venting is the deliber-
ate and controlled release of radioactive steam from 
the containment vessel of a nuclear reactor; it aims 
to lower its pressure and temperature and is usually 
accomplished by opening motor or air operated 
valves. While the order to begin the manoeuvre was 
finally issued on the night of 12–13 March, teams in 
the field were unable to open any valves due to a 
lack of suitable equipment; their problems were 
compounded by their inability to measure the reac-
tor’s various parameters. Finally, water injection be-
gan on the morning of 13 March.  
During these many and various attempts to both 
vent and inject water, TEPCO headquarters contin-
ued to interfere with the decisions taken by the 
emergency response centre. They initially criticized 
workers for their slowness in carrying out the water 
injection and prohibited them from using sea water 
in reactor 1. Moreover, they ordered them to stop 
spraying water on the containment vessel in order to 
prepare for venting.  
This excerpt sheds light on the management of the 
accident by Fukushima workers. It highlights the 
conditions they had to work in and makes it possible 
to identify the characteristics of engineering thinking 
in emergency situations in action. 
4.2 The markers of engineering thinking in 
emergency situations 
The value of this extract is that contains several 
elements that are not fully reflected in the official 
reports. It highlights the difficulty experienced by 
teams in managing multiple events with limited hu-
man and material resources, in very hostile condi-
tions and an uncertain situation. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates the progressive divide that developed 
between workers and the on-site emergency response 
centre on the one hand, and TEPCO headquarters on 
the other.  
In such circumstances, individuals find themselves 
in what can be called an ‘extreme’ situation that af-
fects decision-making processes and actions 
(Travadel and Guarnieri, 2015). In such a situation, 
the actions that are taken fail to “regain control of 
the production unit, [and] are viewed by society as 
being responsible for an imminent danger with ir-
revocable consequences” (Ibid.).  
At the hearing, Yoshida challenges some of the 
figures put forward by the investigators. He states 
that certain data could never have been collected and 
that it must have been deduced at a later date, or that 
he does not remember. For example, regarding the 
pressure in reactor 3, Yoshida states that it was not 
measured. No-one on the site knew what it was at 
the time of the accident. It was therefore added at a 
later date. Whether this data was available or not bi-
ases the reading of events, as the inability to access 
certain data played a fundamental role in the man-
agement of the accident, “I would like you to keep in 
mind the possibility that while we were unable to ob-
serve the data; it was possible, later, to insert fig-
ures that came from somewhere else. In fact, when 
we checked the instruments in the emergency re-
sponse centre, most of the time there were no num-
bers, collecting data was impossible.” (Guarnieri et 
al., 2015).  
In this statement, Yoshida tries to correct the rep-
resentation that the investigators may have had of 
how events unfolded. The chronology provided by 
TEPCO was established a posteriori. Figures that 
“came from somewhere else” (and were not collected 
locally) totally distort the sequence of events. The 
director’s description of being “unable to observe 
the data”, saying that “collecting data was impossi-
ble” demonstrates their lack of anything that would 
them to understand the actual state of the plant.  
This lack of data highlights the uncertainty of the 
situation. At times teams had to enter the units with 
no knowledge at all of their state, “The thing is that 
we had to manoeuvre without being able to see any-
thing. None of the parameters that we would nor-
mally monitor were available. So, when you ask if 
the venting was successful, I can only say that I do 
not know. If you need a simple answer, I would say I 
do not know. If I look at the circumstantial evidence, 
I would say that it seemed that it was done at one 
time or another. I can’t be any surer. So when peo-
ple talk as if it was venting under normal conditions 
in units that were working perfectly, that annoys me 
as well” (Ibid., 221).  
Yoshida once again emphasizes the inaccuracy of 
the representation created by the chronological time-
line, which provides a version of events that is very 
different to the situation actually experienced by 
workers. TEPCO, which wanted to establish an ex-
haustive chronology, provided inaccurate data that 
led to inaccurate conclusions, such as that venting 
operations ran smoothly. However, Yoshida insists 
that understanding his representation of the accident, 
including the visibility of actors, offers a contextual 
overview of the decisions that were taken. The diffi-
culty in carrying out certain tasks and the frustration 
of workers are put forward as other key elements in 
the management of the crisis.  
In addition to the very hostile working conditions, 
a lack of personnel and suitable equipment hampered 
the work. Furthermore, teams had to perform several 
tasks simultaneously. The extract highlights the dis-
tance that separated the on-site teams and TEPCO 
headquarters at the representational level. It is seen 
in the injunctions that are handed down to the emer-
gency response centre by TEPCO, which reinforce 
the divide between them, “You have three nuclear 
units that are falling apart, right before your eyes, 
you’re doing the impossible with the few staff you 
have, and they dare to say that we are too slow? I 
cannot forgive those people.” (Ibid.).  
In this quote, Yoshida reminds us of the difficulty 
of managing the situation with such limited re-
sources. TEPCO’s criticism of the slow pace of op-
erations horrified him, and he found it unforgivable. 
The words reveal the divide between TEPCO and 
the staff at Fukushima. In general, Yoshida’s testi-
mony demonstrates his loyalty to his workforce, to 
the difficulty that all experienced; the sacrifice of 
some and the suffering of others. At the same time, 
he refuses to accept the accusations levelled at them 
by people who were remote from any immediate 
danger and the tensions generated by the unfolding 
events. “Those people” did not understand the chal-
lenges of managing the accident and seemed to con-
sider the workforce as either the guilty party, or in-
competent.  
Teams on the ground had to simultaneously find 
alternatives to conventional systems, and repair 
damaged resources (such as the various water supply 
and storage systems). Workers sought alternative so-
lutions. An important example is the use of car bat-
teries to provide power to instrumentation. As there 
was no electricity, batteries or generators, workers 
came up with the idea of using the batteries from 
their own cars. This initiative was taken despite the 
state of the roads, the lack of lighting, the risk of 
seismic shock, the lack of staff and time. Further-
more, the batteries then had to be delivered to the 
control room to be connected. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This analysis illustrates the value of looking in 
detail at the testimony of a principal player in the 
management of the accident. Yoshida’s account of 
events provides valuable material for understanding 
the management of the post-tsunami situation at Fu-
kushima Dai Ichi. His testimony helps to fill in gaps 
and correct factual inaccuracies present in investiga-
tion reports. Finally, it provides an opportunity to 
identify several markers of extreme situations and 
indicators of engineering thinking in emergency sit-
uations in action.  
Further work could use speech or textual analysis 
tools to look in more detail at the testimony and ex-
pand our knowledge of Yoshida’s representation of 
the accident. Specific themes could be selected (such 
as his relationship with time, or his memory of 
events) that would improve our understanding of the 
mechanisms that come into play in such a situation. 
Their impact on decision making, actions, and engi-
neering organizations, could therefore be identified.  
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